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National Council on Crime and Delinquency
The founding of  the American juvenile court in 1899 
was based on the urgent need to stop the exploitation 
and abuse of  children in adult prisons and jails. The Na-
tional Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) was 
created in 1907 in part to promote this crucial reform 
agenda. The struggle for justice for children continues 
today.
Accurate national data on the problem of  sexual assault 
in juvenile corrections facilities are diffi cult to assemble. 
The Offi ce of  Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention (OJJDP) is soon to release the fi nal version of  
the Survey of  Youth in Residential Placement (SYRP). 
The survey was conducted in 2003 to provide impor-
tant national-level information on many aspects of  
the conditions of  confi nement in juvenile facilities. It 
provides the fi rst ever nationally representative estimates 
of  victimization of  youth in custody as reported by the 
young people themselves (Sedlak, 2008). The sample for 
the SYRP was approximately 7,000 incarcerated youth. 
These data have not yet been fully published by OJJDP; 
however, the preliminary SYRP data1 show that 4% 
of  confi ned youth (4% of  males and 5% of  females) 
reported being the victim of  sexual assault while in 
custody. Most of  those reporting sexual assault had been 
victimized multiple times: 41% reported one or two as-
saults; 56% reported three or more assaults.
Nearly half  of  those reporting sexual assault (49%) 
said they had been assaulted by a staff  member (54%, 
for males; 30%, for females); over half  said they had 
been assaulted by another youth resident, usually some-
one they knew. Almost a quarter (24%) reported that 
a weapon, usually a knife, was used in one or more of  
their sexual assaults.
More recent work by the Bureau of  Justice Statistics 
(BJS) offers a glimpse at offi cially reported sexual abuse 
in state juvenile facilities, and BJS is currently planning 
another survey of  incarcerated young people (Beck & 
Hughes, 2005).
1  SYRP Advisory Board Meeting, December 10-11, 2003.
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The following observations are primarily based on a 
comprehensive investigation of  the California Youth 
Authority (CYA),2 which was requested by the Califor-
nia Attorney General in 2003 in response to a lawsuit 
(Farrell v. Cate) fi led by the Prison Law Offi ce (Krisberg, 
2003). The lawsuit led to a consent decree to rectify 
problems in the system, which are still being monitored 
by the court-appointed monitoring team.3 The CYA 
(now the Division of  Juvenile Justice or DJJ) operates 
six large facilities that house approximately 1,800 young 
people convicted of  very serious offenses. Ten years ago 
California youth prisons held nearly 10,000 inmates, but 
the state has closed fi ve large training schools since the 
litigation began.
All youth in the California DJJ are housed in antiquated 
and decrepit facilities that most observers agree must be 
replaced. Some youth continue to live in open barracks 
or dorms. In these dorms, staff  are usually stationed 
in a caged security post with a limited ability to visually 
observe the behavior in the living units. 
Other states have serious problems as well. The Texas 
Youth Commission has come near to collapsing under 
the weight of  the exposure of  widespread sexual abuse 
in its facilities. The Florida DJJ has closed many of  its 
residential programs over the past fi ve years due to al-
legations of  abusive practices. In Marion County, Indi-
ana, the local prosecutor indicted several staff  from the 
county’s detention facility for girls. 
The California investigation covered all sorts of  vio-
lence in state juvenile facilities. It included a review of  
thousands of  pages of  offi cial documents and all DJJ 
statistics that were pertinent to youth safety and welfare 
issues. Site visits were conducted at six DJJ facilities. 
Highest in importance were confi dential interviews 
with a cross section of  over 100 youth and additional 
interviews with dozens of  staff  members, all of  which 
continues as part of  the court monitoring work.
2  In July, 2005, the CYA was merged into the California Department of  
Corrections and Rehabilitation as the Division of  Juvenile Justice (DJJ).
3   The DJJ submitted a remedial plan that was reviewed by the court on 
June 30, 2006. At that time, the Governor and the Legislature appeared 
willing to commit nearly $110 million to start the reforms. Since 2003, little 
changed to reduce the violence and conditions described in this testimony.
The California DJJ is still plagued with high levels of  
violence and fear, especially at its larger institutions. 
Fights, assaults on staff, and riots are common occur-
rences. Incidents of  violence, gang and racial confl icts, 
and staff fears have led to reliance on extended periods 
of  lockdown, with many youth spending an average of  
21 hours per day in their cells. There is virtually daily use 
of  chemical and mechanical restraints, and many cor-
rectional staff  wear equipment such as security vests and 
helmets—trappings more typical of  maximum security 
adult prisons than juvenile correctional institutions. In 
the past, some of  the facilities have employed guard 
dogs to maintain order, although this practice has been 
recently abandoned. Suicide attempts are not uncom-
mon events; four institutionalized youths took their own 
lives in the last two years. Sexual assaults are part of  
these horrifi c conditions.
Offi cial California DJJ Data on Violence 
and Sexual Assaults
The California DJJ possesses little reliable data on 
violence in its institutions. Addressing this absence of  
management information is a key part of  the proposed 
reform agenda. The best, albeit incomplete, data on DJJ 
violence come from the Disciplinary Decision Mak-
ing System (DDMS).4 This information system covers 
allegations of  youth misconduct. A review of  sustained 
serious disciplinary infractions at six DJJ facilities allows 
for a very conservative measure of  violence, because 
it does not count incidents in which the assaults were 
not observed by staff, cases that could not be proved 
to agency fact fi nders, or situations in which less severe 
sanctions were employed. However, even this conser-
vative measurement documented over 4,000 serious 
infractions for youth-on-youth assaults and batteries at 
six DJJ institutions—over ten per day.5 It would require 
an in-depth analysis of  these instances to determine how 
many of  these violent events included sexual violence. 
But, in addition to these assaults, there were another 
nine sustained disciplinary infractions for sexual assaults 
and 56 sustained charges for sexual acts. DJJ staff  dis-
4  Information on staff  sexual assault is closely protected by state 
personnel and union agreements and is very diffi cult to obtain.
5   In 2002, these facilities housed 3,820 youth on average.
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tinguish between these categories based on their judg-
ments of whether they believe the acts were consensual. 
In practice these staff  judgments are extremely subjec-
tive and somewhat arbitrary. In the same year, there 
were also 925 sustained serious infractions for sexual 
harassment, which cover a very wide range of  behaviors 
including sexual gestures, provocative language, public 
masturbation, and other activities defi ned broadly as 
sexual horseplay directed at either other youth or staff. 
It is diffi cult to determine without inspection of  detailed 
incident reports how many of  these disciplinary charges 
actually include sexual assaults.
California Youth Interviews
Few of  the interviewed youth felt safe in DJJ facilities. 
A typical response was, “This is a jail fi lled with danger-
ous people.” Some youth, especially youth who openly 
identifi ed as gay, bisexual, lesbian, or transgender, told 
of  being sexually assaulted in the barracks or dorms. 
These youth also reported that staff  did not take these 
violent victimizations seriously. The youth reported that 
staff  believed that most sexual behavior in the dorms 
was consensual. Staff  tended to downplay reports of  
rape as coming from youths who had consented to sex, 
but then regretted their actions. In general, facility super-
intendents took this problem more seriously than living 
unit staff, and DJJ central offi ce staff  reviewed a small 
number of  the incidents that were investigated at the 
institutional level.6 The only recourse that most victim-
ized youth had was to fi le a grievance, which did require 
a subsequent administrative review. However, grievances 
were routinely processed by other youth inmates who 
acted as grievance clerks. Many of  these youth had little 
faith in the grievance procedure and often discouraged 
victims from reporting assaults.7 A few youth wrote let-
ters to the DJJ director complaining of  their victimiza-
tion, but they generally received a response drafted by 
facility staff.
6  DJJ headquarters is attempting to review a larger proportion of  incidents 
involving the use of  force. The proposal to fund reforms would increase 
the number of  staff  dedicated to monitoring activities at the institutions.
7  The DJJ has recently reduced the responsibilities of  the youth grievance 
clerks and replaced them with paid staff.
Other youth who were avowedly heterosexual also 
described sexual assaults, including group rapes. Youth 
tended to categorize this behavior as sexual “horseplay.” 
Almost none of  these assaults were reported to authori-
ties. Most youth felt that fi ghting back was the way to 
fend off  sexual assaults. Gang affi liations provided allies 
to protect youth from these situations. Youth who were 
not gang members were especially vulnerable.
To escape repeated victimization, some youth deliber-
ately assaulted other youth or staff  to be placed in single 
rooms in temporary detention units or other restricted 
housing units. Many staff  reported that a signifi cant 
number of  youth in these lockup units were essentially 
protective custody cases, not particularly violent youth. 
Even though this meant being confi ned for at least 21 
hours a day, these youth described being locked up as a 
respite from “always having to watch your back” in the 
barracks. Also, especially vulnerable youth engaged in 
abnormal behavior such as suicidal gestures, smearing 
feces on themselves or their beds, or claiming they were 
having psychotic episodes. Such behaviors resulted in 
reviews by DJJ psychologists or psychiatrists and poten-
tial placement in a mental health unit where the youth 
resided in single rooms. Both custody and clinical staff  
often discounted these outward signs of  mental illness 
as attempts by some youths to manipulate their living 
unit assignments.
There seemed to be little focus on sexual victimization. 
The dominant focus of  DJJ staff  was to prevent gang-
related violence and assaults on staff. Due to a concern 
about sexual harassment in the workplace, sexual be-
havior or language that might otherwise be overlooked 
is defi ned as harassment if  it is directed at or observed 
by female correctional offi cers or counselors. In these 
cases, the behavior may be punished with as serious a 
sanction as a 90-day time add. Training of  staff  on the 
topic of  reducing sexual assaults among youth was rare. 
As noted earlier, few data were routinely collected or 
reviewed by DJJ managers. Investigations of  allegations 
of  staff  sexual misconduct with DJJ youth, especially 
young women, surfaced periodically. These allegations 
were investigated in highly confi dential forums. During 
my investigation, I encountered a few youth grievances 
that alleged that staff  had engaged in inappropriate 
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sexual conduct with the youth inmates. In these cases, 
the accused staff  were permitted to resign, were placed 
on limited duty, or the charges were dropped. Even in 
cases in which the DJJ management fi red staff  for a 
range of  allegations of  excessive use of  force or other 
proscribed behavior, the State Personnel Board restored 
these staff  to regular employee status. There were no 
criminal prosecutions of  DJJ staff  despite allegations of  
felony law violations.
By any measure, sexual assault was a signifi cant problem 
in DJJ facilities and was inextricably tied to an overarch-
ing climate of  violence and fear. Sexual assaults were 
part of  patterns of  physical intimidation and threats 
that some youth use to establish their power within an 
extremely violent institutional culture. Moreover, a large 
number of  DJJ residents suffer from severe mental ill-
ness. Health care for these troubled youngsters is woe-
fully inadequate, creating an even more chaotic atmo-
sphere. The use of  the DDMS or the youth grievance 
system is not effective to stem the problem of  sexual 
assaults. Current California DJJ facilities are danger-
ous and not designed to promote the safety of  youth or 
staff. Staff  training to prevent unwanted sexual behavior 
in DJJ facilities is insuffi cient. Although responses for 
many of  these safety defi ciencies are included in the DJJ 
remedial plans, it remains to be seen how quickly these 
needed reforms can be implemented. 
Sexual Abuse in Texas Juvenile Facilities
In 2007, systematic abuse of  youth in the west Texas 
facility at Pyote began to come to light. An investiga-
tion into the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) revealed 
unchecked sexual abuse of  youth wards by high-level 
facility staff  (Swanson, 2007a). TYC executive leadership 
denied knowledge of  frequent abuse at the Pyote facility, 
as did the facility’s superintendents. However, casework-
ers reported multiple attempts to bring the intolerable 
situation to light many months prior. A former assistant 
facility superintendent and school principal allegedly 
engaged in repeated sexual activity with wards, under 
the threat of  time adds or other punishments or entice-
ments (Swanson, 2007a). 
As the investigation unfolded, over 750 wards from 
every Texas youth facility began to come forward with 
allegations of  sexual misconduct ranging from fl irta-
tion to rape (Swanson, 2007b). Clearly, widespread lack 
of  appropriate response at all levels of  authority and a 
culture of  tolerance for such behavior were key factors. 
Even the US Department of  Justice was unable to take 
action, despite knowing for four years of  allegations of  
staff  abuse; as many as 2,000 such offenses were con-
fi rmed from 2003 to 2006. 
In many instances of  confi rmed allegations, staff  were 
eventually fi red. However, even in cases where offenses 
were classifi ed as felonies, no TYC staff  member served 
prison time (Hoppe & Swanson, 2007). 
Multiple factors helped to lead the TYC into its recent 
crisis. To begin with, straying from its mission of  treat-
ing the most serious cases, the TYC tripled its bed 
space from 1995 to 2005, fi lling those beds with mostly 
nonviolent youth who would be far better served in their 
home communities. Furthermore, the practices involved 
in this overincarceration have had a disproportionate, 
negative impact on youth of  color; as much as 75% of  
the TYC population is youth of  color (TCAJJ, no date). 
The facilities are some of  the largest in the nation, lead-
ing to inherent problems of  adequate supervision and 
an atmosphere all too akin to adult prison. Add to all 
of  that the lack of  any meaningful oversight in facilities 
that may benefi t local economies, but whose isolation 
is immensely problematic for the youth and families in 
question.
In the wake of  the widespread scandal, the Texas Senate 
ordered the overhaul of  the agency and required that all 
misdemeanor cases be handled by local authorities, sig-
naling a return to the Commission’s original mandate of  
detaining the most serious and chronic youth offenders. 
To its credit, the legislative body attempted to respond 
to a desperately corrupt situation by ordering a progres-
sive list of  reforms, including extensive training for 
guards, criminal history checks for prospective employ-
ees, and a grievance process for youth that has integrity. 
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However, as investigations continued, the agency ap-
peared more and more beleaguered by political infi ght-
ing, abuses of  authority toward subordinates, intimida-
tion of  whistleblowers, and other indicators of  a system 
in collapse.
Even after being turned over to a conservator, TYC’s 
problems have not been resolved. Five executive direc-
tors came and went in the course of  a year. There is 
some motivation in the Legislature to abolish TYC and 
merge its programs with those of  the counties. Recently, 
TYC has recruited a nationally respected juvenile justice 
leader, Cheryl Townsend, to lead the agency.
Abuse in Florida Juvenile Facilities
In 2000, NCCD warned Florida lawmakers about the 
potential victimization and abuse of  girls in a maximum 
security correctional environment (Acoca, 2000). Since 
its opening in 2000 under Premier Behavioral Solu-
tions, the Florida Institute for Girls (FIG) was plagued 
by hundreds of  allegations of  physical abuse, neglect, 
sexual misbehavior, and management problems. These 
allegations prompted a grand jury investigation in June, 
2003. According to a well publicized Grand Jury Report, 
the facility had over 150 allegations of  criminal activ-
ity including excessive force, sexual misconduct, and 
inadequate supervision (Palm Beach County Grand Jury, 
2004; Gruskin, 2004-2005). The investigation found a 
lack of  training, persistent staff  shortages, and a general 
sense of  unrest at the facility. Many media headlines 
painted gruesome conditions for girls.
Within fi ve years (by October, 2005), all 67 girls were 
transferred from FIG, and the maximum security prison 
was offi cially closed. But even in its last month, a long-
time guard was arrested for sexual assault against a 15 
year-old girl. 
At another program for girls, Sawmill Academy, a su-
pervisor was charged with eight felony counts involving 
sexual contact with girls in his custody. Investigators said 
three girls reported having sex with him and that he so-
licited sex or made plans to have relations with girls on 
four other occasions (Tallahassee Democrat, 2002).
The problems in Florida extend to boys’ juvenile jus-
tice programs and detention centers as well. In 2003, 
Omar Paisley’s death in the Miami-Dade juvenile deten-
tion center became a symbol of  the problems. His case 
involved medical neglect. Omar complained of  severe 
abdominal pain for three days, but staff  ignored his 
pleas because they thought he was faking. They pro-
vided no medical attention. The boy died of  a ruptured 
appendix that could have been treated. The grand jury 
investigation found an “utter lack of  humanity” within 
the detention center. In 2006, there was another high 
profi le death. Martin Lee Anderson, age 14, was beaten 
by seven guards and suffocated through the use of  
ammonia capsules at a boot camp operated by the Bay 
County Sheriff ’s Department in Panama City, Florida. A 
local jury acquitted the staff  of  criminal charges.
In the 2000-01 budget year, there were 2,285 allega-
tions of  abuse from juvenile offenders, up from 1,237 
allegations in 1997-98 (Hurtibise, 2002). In the fi rst six 
months of  2004 alone, 80 youths attempted suicide in 
Florida detention facilities. Since 2004, 25 residential 
juvenile justice programs for girls and 56 programs for 
boys have been closed. 
Issues needing immediate attention in Florida include 
overall safety, excessive and unnecessary use of  force 
on youth by staff, unreported incidents of  abuse, work-
ers falsifying log books, failure to perform preliminary 
background checks on nine out of  ten workers hired, 
failure to provide pregnant girls with prenatal care, and 
accusations of  staff  giving drugs to youth.
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Abuse in Marion County, Indiana
A Civil Rights of  Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) 
review in Marion County, Indiana, revealed issues similar 
to those in Texas and Florida. Policies covering pro-
hibited sexual misconduct were often lacking or overly 
vague. Youth grievance systems were less than fully 
effective, and background checks for employees were 
handled  inconsistently. Staff  training was woefully inad-
equate. Policies and practices for fairly and completely 
investigating sexual misconduct in the facility were not 
suffi cient. The Girls Detention Facility suffered from a 
range of  poor conditions, including too limited mental 
health services and physically, verbally, and sexually abu-
sive practices. There was breakdown in the “culture of  
care,” which created an unhealthy organizational climate 
in which many abuses were overlooked or rational-
ized. County offi cials and the juvenile court are moving 
aggressively to rectify many of  these concerns. With 
support from the Annie E. Casey Foundation, Marion 
County has made signifi cant progress in diverting inap-
propriate youth from detention and in improving the 
levels of  care. Although the local jury acquitted all the 
indicted staff  members (similar to events in Florida), the 
US Department of  Justice has continued to pursue civil 
rights violations.
Recommendations for Reforms
Key recommendations to reduce youth violence and 
sexual assaults in troubled youth corrections systems are 
as follows:
Youth corrections systems must implement re-
search-based risk and needs assessment classifi ca-
tion systems to identify those youth most likely to 
be victims and victimizers. Living unit assignments 
and staffi ng should be guided by objective classifi ca-
tion information. An excellent example of  a system 
that can reduce institutional violence is the Juvenile 
Intervention and Assessment System (JAIS), devel-
oped by the NCCD.
Living unit sizes must be no larger than 20 youth. 
Barracks-style dorms should be phased out and 
•
•
staff-youth ratios should be less than 1 to 8. Anti-
quated and unsafe institutions must be replaced with 
“state-of-the-art” facility designs that permit greater 
monitoring of  youth behavior and that encourage 
more staff  and youth communication and interac-
tion.
Staff  need training in techniques such as Normative 
Culture, which was developed by the North Ameri-
can Family Institute (see Krisberg, 1992). Norma-
tive Culture creates “communities of  dignity and 
respect” in juvenile correctional programs. It teaches 
staff  to enlist youth residents in the common goal 
of  ensuring safety of  all those who live or work in 
these facilities.
Training in gender-responsive adolescent psychologi-
cal development must be required of  all staff  work-
ing in juvenile corrections facilities. In particular, 
staff  need a better understanding of  the victimiza-
tion of  gay, bisexual, lesbian, and transgender youth.
There must be adequate numbers of  medical and 
mental health professionals assigned to juvenile 
facilities, and these clinical staff  should be trained in 
recognizing and responding appropriately to instanc-
es of  sexual victimization. Health and mental health 
staff  need better information on the links between 
histories of  maltreatment, sexual victimization, and 
violent behavior (Widom, 1992).
Institutionalized youth need access to reporting and 
grievance systems that result in genuine and thor-
ough investigations of  their alleged victimization.
Youth facilities should be open to regular inspec-
tions by bona fi de outside groups that can conduct 
confi dential interviews with youth to identify poten-
tial problems of  sexual victimization. 
Juvenile facilities need to create adolescent living 
environments that are as normal as possible. Youth 
facilities should not embrace the trappings and 
methods of  prisons. Harsh custodial tactics breed 
institutional violence. Juvenile corrections systems 
need to rediscover the importance of  the concepts 
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Concluding Observations
The horrid conditions of  confi nement found in the 
California DJJ are not an anomaly. The media has re-
ported many examples of  abusive treatment of  youth 
in jurisdictions such as Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, 
Georgia, Florida, Hawai`i, Indiana, Louisiana, the Mari-
ana Islands, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, and South Dakota, to name 
a few. In the last several years, the US Department of  
Justice has initiated an unprecedented number of  inves-
tigations of  juvenile facilities under the Civil Rights of  
Institutionalized Persons Act. Youth advocates in many 
states have challenged the conditions of  confi nement in 
federal and state courts as unconstitutional. The Nation-
al Institute of  Corrections and the Offi ce of  Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention have continued their 
training, publications, and technical assistance to im-
prove the circumstances confronting youth in confi ne-
ment. Nongovernmental groups such as Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International have brought these 
issues to the public’s attention.
To begin stimulating positive action on this issue, Con-
gress should amend the federal Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) to require that all 
states receiving federal funds must 1) conduct a compre-
hensive study of  the nature, extent, and causes of  rape 
in juvenile institutions; and 2) present “good faith” plans 
to OJJDP to remedy this problem. OJJDP should be re-
quired to produce an annual report to Congress on rape 
in juvenile facilities and to present effective methods to 
eliminate it. This same approach was put forth by ad-
vocates that were concerned with the disproportionate 
numbers of  minority youth in the juvenile justice sys-
tem. Similar to eliminating rape in juvenile correctional 
facilities, reducing disproportionate minority confi ne-
ment is a complex issue and is not likely to be resolved 
very quickly. But, a new amendment to the JJDPA would 
give great impetus to those looking for solutions and as-
sistance to victims.
We ignore the problem of  violence and sexual victim-
ization in juvenile corrections at our own peril. All the 
youth presently incarcerated will return to our com-
munities in a very short time. They will return home 
either better or worse for their experience in juvenile 
corrections. Unchecked violence and sexual assault in 
juvenile facilities will lead to more tragedies and victims 
in the community. Moreover, the failure to protect the 
troubled and vulnerable young people that are now in 
juvenile corrections calls into question the legitimacy of  
our child welfare and juvenile court laws and the human-
ity of  our civilization. The recommendations presented 
above could make measurable improvements to this 
situation.
The original version of this paper was presented 
to the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission.
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